# Affirmative Answers

## Uniqueness

### Non-Unique – AI/Cyber/Biotech

#### Non-unique: 15 years of plans and increasing cooperation in tech sectors should have triggered the impact

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The Alliance’s Achievements in Cyber So Far Over the past fifteen years, NATO’s approach to cyber issues has evolved from addressing cyber defense in primarily technical terms to viewing it as essential to the alliance’s strategic context. The need to “strengthen capabilities and to defend against cyberattacks” was first acknowledged by allied leaders at their 2002 summit meetings in Prague.1919NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, November 21, 2002. However, after Estonia’s digital infrastructure was hit by cyberattacks in 2007, NATO admitted that a confrontation between states might involve a cyber dimension, and at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 adopted its first cyber-defense policy. The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated that cyberattacks have the potential to become a major component of conventional warfare. In parallel, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was accredited as a NATO Centre of Excellence in 2008. Since then, it has grown into a strong, international knowledge hub for cyber defense, bringing together top cyber experts across fields—government, military, industry, and academia—from 29 nations for interdisciplinary research, training, and exercises in four focus areas: technology, strategy, operations, and law. The center connects a trusted community of like-minded states who wish to share information and expertise in cyber security. CCDCOE’s best-known projects are Locked Shields, one of the world’s largest and most comprehensive cyber-defense exercises; the annual cyber conference CyCon; and the Tallinn Manual, which looks at cyber operations within the context of international law. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to improving the alliance’s cyber defenses by bringing all of NATO’s networks under centralized protection. At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO recognized that international law applies in cyberspace and declared that, since the impact of a cyberattack could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack, cyber defense is a part of NATO’s collective defense mandate. Thus, NATO acknowledged that cyberspace is an operational domain for potential adversaries. NATO’s 2016 Warsaw summit resulted in a declaration recognizing that cyberspace has evolved into a separate domain of military operations, in which the alliance “must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.” The subsequent roadmap included the drafting of a NATO cyber operations doctrine, as well as the development of military cyber capabilities. In January 2020, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations was published “to plan, execute, and assess cyberspace operations in the context of allied joint operations.”2020NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, January 2020. At the Warsaw summit, NATO heads of state and government signed a Cyber Defence Pledge, in which they outlined how nations protect their cyber networks. NATO developed detailed questionnaires and metrics related to the pledge and uses them to regularly report on how each nation delivers on its cyber commitments. Allies also discussed how to strengthen the cyber component of NATO’s Command Structure. The Command Structure is the military backbone of the alliance; it is what makes NATO unique. NATO has continuously adapted its Command Structure over the past decades to take account of a changing security environment. In February 2018, NATO defense ministers established the Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC) as part of NATO’s SHAPE Command Structure, with the aim of integrating the allies’ cyber capabilities into NATO military-operations planning. The “eyes and ears” of the respective commanders in cyberspace, CyOC aims at enhancing situational awareness in cyberspace and helping integrate cyber into NATO’s planning and operations at all levels. CyOC is the first cyber-dedicated entity within the Command Structure. The “eyes and ears” of the respective commanders in cyberspace, CyOC aims at enhancing situational awareness in cyberspace and helping integrate cyber into NATO’s planning and operations at all levels. While CyOC operates within the existing NATO frameworks, its main aim is to equip the Supreme Allied Commander Europe with any necessary tools to operate in cyberspace.2121Wiesław Goździewicz, “Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA),” Cyber Defense, November 11, 2019. As CyOC moves toward initial then final operating capacity, it will be critical that it is staffed with sufficient—and sufficiently expert—personnel.2222NATO, NATO's Role in Cyberspace, February 19, 2019. During NATO’s July 2018 summit, the allies affirmed, for the first time, their determination “to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats,” shifting away from securing cyberspace with defensive measures only. The “full range” of cyber capabilities means that both defensive and offensive capabilities can be deployed by NATO, in line with its defensive mandate and in accordance with international law. As NATO will not develop or acquire any offensive capabilities, it will rely, like in other operational domains, on the voluntary contributions of allies. In late 2020, a team of experts appointed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and chaired by Thomas de Maiziere of Germany and Wes Mitchell of the United States gave their recommendations on how NATO could enhance its political role and better coordinate military tasks and political strategies among its members. In 2021, Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 included eight of those recommendations to guide the revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept.23

#### The link is not unique or NATO’s quantum and DIANA plans should have caused the impact – affects entire emerging tech sector

Naujokaityte and Burke 22 - Goda Naujokaitytė and Fintan Burke are frequent contributors to Science|Business and emerging technology analysts, [*“NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,"* Science|Business, 4/1/2022, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies]RA

NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues. The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space. In its initial stage, DIANA will run a network of more than 10 accelerator sites and over 50 test centres in innovation hubs across NATO alliance countries. The aim is to give innovators the means to bring dual use technologies closer to the market. No budget for the network has been announced yet, but pilot activities will start as early as summer 2023, with the aim of being fully up and running in 2025. There is also a complementary €1 billion venture capital fund for early stage start-ups. Tomas Jermalavičius, head of studies at the Estonia-based think tank International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), says this marks a notable shift in the alliance’s stance on innovation. “It‘s almost a revolutionary step. Creating this NATO structure shows flexibility and ability to take advantage of all the capacities that exist in the private sector, where innovations are born,“ he said. Until this point, the alliance has only supported applied research through the Collaboration Support Office in Paris, leaving a gap in support for translating technologies to the market. The bid to spruce up its innovation capabilities predates the Russian invasion and was agreed on at the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels. The fleshed out plans for DIANA were published last week, following a meeting of NATO defence ministers. This is not the only military research announcement to pop up in the past weeks, with the US, Australia and UK setting out the AUKUS Quantum arrangement which eyes expanded quantum, hypersonic and other joint weapons research. Technology dominance The nine technologies NATO wants to advance are AI; data and computing; autonomy; quantum-enabled technologies; biotechnology and human enhancements; hypersonic technologies; space; novel materials and manufacturing; and energy and propulsion. These are all strategic for NATO if it is to maintain technological dominance. Losing grip was one of the drivers for DIANA, Jermalavičius says. The bid for technology dominance over countries like China and Russia is also a driver for DIANA‘s goal of shortening the technology development cycle, especially when it comes to software, AI and quantum. “It’s a long horizon, but capabilities do not appear overnight,” said Jermalavičius. The plan is for DIANA to launch challenge calls for non-dilutive financing that does not require start-ups to give up equity or ownership in their company. Mentoring, technology testing and potential contract opportunities will be available to go hand in hand with the financing. This will be delivered through network of innovation hubs across the alliance. One such site is the Big Data for Smart Society Institute (GATE) based in Bulgaria. An official at GATE said that the institute’s work in DIANA will focus on digital health, intra governmental communications and using data in industry and city infrastructure. One focus will be on disinformation research. However the official noted DIANA is still in its early stages. Talks are ongoing with NATO to flesh out exactly how cooperation will work between research centres, the national government, and the NATO secretariat. The approved charter stipulates some details, though others are still to be discussed, for example the affiliated centres of the network and the points of contact between them. The official said that many of these are likely to be finalised at a meeting at the end of June. Host institutions Last week, the UK and Estonia were announced as the hosts of the European part of DIANA. The Estonian accelerator will be based in Tallinn, while Imperial College London will host the UK headquarters at its Translation & Innovation Hub, from where the Institute for Security Science and Technology will lead Imperial’s work in DIANA. The UK headquarters is also supported by the UK Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), which funds projects that have uses in defence and security. The accelerator works with major defence companies and the US Department of Defence’s Tri-Service Office. The UK and Estonian accelerators are to support start-ups working on dual-use technologies with funding and expertise. Researchers will also be able to use facilities such as the Defence BattleLab in Dorset, UK, a test centre that has air and sea ranges to test defence equipment. A DASA representative said research at the UK headquarters is likely to focus first on AI and autonomy, which is a focus of DIANA as a whole. Over time the UK site could to expand into biotechnology and materials. Nine accelerators are foreseen in Portugal, UK, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Czech Republic. Most European NATO members will host test sites, of which there will be 47 in total, except for France, Lithuania, and five Balkan countries, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia. Quantum in Denmark Denmark is leading DIANA’s quantum bid, with an accelerator to be located at the Niels Bohr Institute at Copenhagen University. The Technical University of Denmark, Aarhus University and the Danish National Metrology Institute will also provide test centres and manufacturing facilities. For now, the goal is to augment the overall quantum capacities in the alliance, rather than focus on dual-use technologies. “The main mission here is to augment the entire NATO alliance within quantum technology,” said Jan Westenkær Thomsen, head of the Niels Bohr Institute. Denmark has been one of the leaders in quantum physics since the 1920s, when Bohr and his colleague Max Planck put forward the quantum theory. This deep expertise in quantum has resulted in many spin out companies, Thomsen noted. In the coming months, Thomsen and his colleagues will be hashing out the details of the centre with NATO. One of the universities’ goals is to use the know how of Denmark’s biotechnology accelerator at the Copenhagen Bio Science Park to reinforce the quantum counterpart. There will also be cooperation with other DIANA centres. “This was already an integral part. I’m hoping this will be a main theme in negotiations with NATO,” said Thomsen. Thomsen hopes the DIANA project will start delivering in five to ten years time, and he is positive about its potential. “It’s of course difficult to say at this stage, but it’s a great idea to pull resources from the whole NATO alliance together,” he said. “I’m pretty sure this will really change something for the better.” Multi-sovereign venture capital Before DIANA is up and running, the €1 billion Innovation Fund is expected to start making awards to start-ups developing dual-use technologies at the beginning of next year. NATO says the fund will be, “the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund”. It will be a patient investor, giving companies uninterrupted support for 15 years to scale up innovations. NATO also intends to invest in the funds of venture capital firms that are already investing in technologies the alliance wants to promote.

## Link

### No Link – generic/no burden sharing

#### Their burden sharing arguments are wrong – all countries benefit from NATO stability

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Trump’s diatribes are not the only cause of the unease. A broadening chorus of realist strategists claims that the United States is overdue for a major strategic retrenchment and that it is past time for Europe to tend its own garden. Even staunch defenders of NATO express doubts about its future. Some worry that the growing U.S. preoccupation with East Asia will lure the United States away from its Atlantic calling and generate transatlantic tensions over how to deal with the rise of China. Others fear that democratic backsliding among members is compromising the alliance’s values-based solidarity. Close NATO watchers are concerned that EU efforts to more deeply integrate European foreign and defense policy could ultimately weaken the Atlantic link. And debate rages on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether NATO enlargement has enhanced or eroded European stability and whether to continue expansion despite the costs to the West’s relationship with Russia. These worries are unwarranted: NATO at 70 is actually in remarkably good shape. Yes, European allies have been laggards on defense spending, and some members—Hungary, Poland, and Turkey in particular—have tarnished democratic credentials. But NATO has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment since the Cold War’s end, ensuring that the United States and Europe remain each other’s go-to partners. The alliance opened its doors to the new democracies that emerged from the former Soviet bloc, helping to anchor security and democracy in a wider Europe. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, members have taken important steps to strengthen deterrence against the Kremlin’s adventurism. NATO has struck partnerships across the globe and carried out ambitious missions well beyond the territory of member states—most notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. All the while, the alliance has retooled to address new hazards such as cyberthreats, terrorism, hybrid warfare, and migration. Precisely because NATO has been so nimble and effective, it enjoys strong political support on both sides of the Atlantic, leaving Trump virtually alone as a vociferous critic.

### No Link –Russia

#### Political competition and perceived anti-Russian sentiment drives Russian diplomacy, NATO’s not key

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This assumption contradicts events of recent months and the historical record. While Vladimir Putin has claimed that his goal is keeping Ukraine out of NATO, he also insisted that he was just conducting military exercises. Instead, he is invading Ukraine again. He likewise insisted in 2014 that he wasn’t capturing Crimea, despite the presence of his unidentified “Little Green Men” and his subsequent annexation of the peninsula, or that he was not fighting in Ukraine’s Donbas area in the east all these years, despite all evidence to the contrary. There is no reason to take Putin at his word. His Feb. 21 diatribe conferring Russian recognition of independence for the two eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and his order for Russian troops to move in as ostensible “peacekeepers” shows clearly his disdain for diplomatic resolutions. Moreover, this is not even primarily about NATO. NATO’s eastward expansion may have played a role in straining the relationship between Russia and the West, but mainly because, for Russia, seeing former satellites eagerly abandon it for the greener pastures of Euro-Atlantic integration stung. However, Putin’s rhetoric and actions over almost two decades reveal that his goals extend beyond imposing neutrality on Ukraine or even staving off further NATO expansion. The larger objective is to re-establish Russian political and cultural dominance over a nation that Putin sees as one with Russia, and then follow up by undoing the European rules-based order and security architecture established in the aftermath of World War II. Given these goals, Ukrainian neutrality is a woefully insufficient concession for Putin. If Russia’s main concern had been NATO enlargement, it would have reacted with rhetoric and/or hostile actions in its neighborhood after each step in the NATO expansion process. The largest wave of NATO’s eastward expansion took place in March 2004, when seven Eastern European countries joined, including the formerly Soviet Baltic states. Russia “grumbled,” as the New York Times put it then, by adopting a Duma resolution criticizing the expansion, but no hostile and sustained rhetoric followed about NATO enlargement as a Western plot against Russian interests. In 1997, Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, and in 2002, he publicly declared Ukraine’s interest in NATO membership, to little opposition from Russia. The NATO membership issue has ebbed-and-flowed within Ukraine, as presidents alternated in power who were either more pro-Western or more pro-Russian. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko advocated during his 2005-2010 tenure for Ukraine to be granted a NATO membership action plan (MAP), a program of preparation for entry into the alliance, while successor President Viktor Yanukovych backed away from the idea after 2010. Russia did not respond to any of these pro-NATO moves by Ukrainian presidents with military threats and aggression. Russia knows further NATO expansion to the east is highly improbable because certain alliance members have long balked at the prospect, making the required consensus impossible to attain. Russia also has an authoritarian ally within NATO, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who can help stave off any future consensus, and other NATO members such as Germany and France do not support membership for Ukraine, Georgia, or other post-Soviet states. The security guarantee that Russia demands now goes much further than membership issues. Putin’s Feb. 21 speech shows he perceives any security cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, from modernization of airports to training exercises, as a “knife to [Russia’s] throat.” Even after a new pro-Western government in Ukraine that followed the 2014 incursions again embraced the goal of NATO membership and Ukrainian public support for such a move rose, Ukraine’s accession was that much more unlikely because of the alliance’s reluctance to embrace new members embroiled in territorial disputes. If Putin’s main concern now was to keep Ukraine out of NATO, he had nothing to fear in 2014, when he first invaded Ukraine and had even less to fear in 2021, when he embarked on the current escalation. If Not NATO, What is Putin’s Escalation About? A longer look at Putin’s two decades in power shows that, above all, he fears political competition in the neighborhood. When mass protests over rigged elections swept across the post-Soviet space in 2003-2005, toppling the Georgian and Kyrgyz incumbents and preventing the pro-Russian candidate from taking office in Ukraine, the Kremlin exploded with fiery rhetoric about Western-backed anti-Russian plots. A recent book on conspiracy theories in the Russian media since 1995 shows that the 2003-2005 “color revolutions” were the top source of conspiratorial, anti-Western narratives. All 1997-2002 NATO enlargement summits are lower in the ranking of analyzed events. American realists have long argued that Russia was too weak to strike back with actions, but evidence shows that the Kremlin did not react with strong rhetoric either. Instead of decrying NATO expansion, Russia prioritized complaints about Western political “meddling” in its neighboring countries, by which Russia meant U.S. and European support for domestic democratization drives. In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and instigated an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine, NATO membership for Ukraine hadn’t even been on the agenda. Rather, the spark for Russia was the ouster of the increasingly authoritarian pro-Russian President Yanukovych, following months of street protests. Those “Euromaidan” protests had erupted after Yanukovych backpeddled, following pressure and bribery from Russia, from signing a trade agreement with the European Union. So why was 2014 so concerning to Russia that it chose to invade? Given Putin’s rhetoric about Euromaidan as a Western-backed plot, the most obvious conclusion is that he was afraid that regime change and democratization in Ukraine might reach – – or at least set an example for — Russian society and destabilize Putin’s increasingly consolidated authoritarianism. Research on the color revolutions and on the third wave of democratization in the region shows that this neighborhood effect was real. In other words, it’s not NATO at its doorsteps that’s so concerning to the Kremlin, but political competition, because it threatens authoritarian stability and introduces prospects of democratization.

### No link – China

#### China’s motivations are too dissimilar for comparison – NATO is not its threat

Scobell and Yang 22 - Dr. Andrew Scobell is a distinguished fellow with the China program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He focuses on U.S.-China relations, China’s armed forces and defense policy and China’s foreign relations with countries and regions around the world — with a particular emphasis on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Lucy Stevenson-Yang is the senior program assistant for the China and North Korea teams at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). At USIP, Stevenson-Yang's research examines China’s impact on international peace and security. Her work also focuses on how to strengthen diplomacy and support peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, [“*China is not Russia. Taiwan is not Ukraine.”,* 3/4/2022, United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine]RA

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations. Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, Xi — at least to date — has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power. Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia’s invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia’s invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing’s long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China’s national interests in Ukraine. Russia’s actions clearly contradict China’s cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine’s armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing’s signature foreign policy and economic initiative. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia’s commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world’s most capable military. The People’s Liberation Army — as all branches of China’s armed forces are known — continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing’s assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States. However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island’s armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China’s increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China’s periphery in recent years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan’s pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine’s diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan’s, the European country’s military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States.

### Link Turn – Emerging tech counters revisionist powers/Cyber

#### Turn: Increasing allied cooperation in (AI/Cyber/Bio)-technology is the only way to effectively combat rising powers without risking primacy.

Rasser and Lamberth 21 – Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth are foreign policy experts and contributors to Center for a New American Security, [“*Taking the Helm A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge,”* CNAS, 1/13/21, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/taking-the-helm-a-national-technology-strategy-to-meet-the-china-challenge#the-case-for-a-national-technology-strategy>]RA

How the United States Should Compete Today The United States is competing with China in technology with one hand tied behind its back.78 While the United States has leading technology companies, the government is underperforming in its role as a critical catalyst of S&T innovation. The federal government has played a more active role in protectionist measures relating to Chinese tech in recent years, including export controls, investment screening, and executive orders banning Chinese firms, but the government has yet to bring to bear its substantial tools to help stoke the fires of American innovation. For the first time in nearly a century, the United States confronts a strategic rival that is capable of overtaking it as the world’s leading economic, military, and technological power, and one that is economically entangled with the United States. Policymakers in Congress and the White House need to recalibrate U.S. government involvement in the country’s innovation ecosystem to maximize advantages and opportunities and to successfully address the challenges that the United States will face in the global technology contest. The nature of this competition is fundamentally different from what America has faced since the 1940s. For the first time in nearly a century the United States confronts a strategic rival that is capable of overtaking it as the world’s leading economic, military, and technological power, and one that is economically entangled with the United States. China is leveraging comprehensive state-directed efforts such as Made in China 2025, Standards 2035, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Digital Silk Road to guide its technology development at home and push its goals of making Chinese technology and technology standards dominant worldwide. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin attend a meeting during the Belt and Road International Forum, an initiative aimed at pursuing dominance in a number of key technology areas. The United States must respond with policies that focus on research and development, patenting, and standard setting. (The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office/Wikimedia) The hallmarks of these initiatives include strategic goals and plans backed with substantial financial resources for R&D, patenting, and standard setting. Neither the United States nor any of the tech-leading democracies has anything equivalent, setting the stage for an uneven competition where Beijing is better positioned to have the upper hand over the long term. This is not to say the United States should emulate China’s top-down approach. Many aspects of China’s approach, such as the creation and promotion of national champions; the coddling of inefficient state-owned enterprises; export subsidies, forced technology transfers, and other illiberal trade practices; and the lack of accountability and oversight are anathema to the American system. At the same time, Beijing’s policies have had impressive results. China is the world’s largest trader, accounting for 12.4 percent of global trade in 2018.79 China’s R&D spending has grown at an average of 15 percent annually since 1998. It is on track to overtake the United States in total R&D spending by the mid-2020s and is at the forefront of foundational technologies such as AI, 5G, and quantum computing.80 The U.S. response has been largely protectionist and unilateral, focused on export controls, tariffs, and repatriation of manufacturing, while R&D spending remains flat as a percentage of GDP and policies to attract and retain high-skilled foreigners become increasingly restrictive. American policymakers must emphasize what is lacking so far: the proactive policies American policymakers can put in place to bolster America’s ability to outcompete. To effectively compete with China, the United States needs a technology strategy for the 21st century and a new approach to multilateral cooperation and collaboration. The United States has an unmatched strategic advantage over China in this technology competition: a global network of allies and partners. Harnessing this network for multilateral collaboration is critical to the success of a national technology strategy. The United States does not enjoy a monopoly over the technologies that will drive the 21st-century economy, but the United States also does not have to go it alone. By partnering with other tech-leading nations, the United States and its allies and partners can bring far more financial and human resources to bear in this competition than China can alone. Opportunities for multinational collaboration on technology policy abound. The United States could look to existing groupings such as the Five Eyes, the National Technology and Industrial Base, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to enhance such collaboration. There are also proposals to create new groupings: U.K. government officials have proposed a “Democracy 10” to tackle 5G and other technology issues; and former U.S. government officials have proposed alliance frameworks to tackle a range of technology policy issues.81 A recent CNAS report by an international group of researchers lays out what countries should comprise such a grouping, how it should be organized and structured, how it should function, and what its top priorities should be.82 Recommendations A strategy’s success hinges on implementation. No expression of strategic direction is complete without actionable recommendations. As the initial framing document for a series of publications that will define and outline a U.S. national technology strategy, this report lays out the four pillars that comprise the actions necessary to execute it. The pillars are to promote America’s ability to compete; protect key U.S. technological advantages; partner with allies to maximize success; and plan effectively to reevaluate and adjust the strategy as needed. This section offers recommendations for each pillar. They include the highest priority actions U.S. policymakers should undertake to safeguard long-term U.S. technological competitiveness. It is by no means an exhaustive list. Rather, it is an opening salvo meant to underscore the scope and scale of the challenge, highlight the urgency with which the United States must act, and stimulate ideas for a broader set of necessary actions. Taken together, these pillars and the recommendations that underpin them are guidelines for a 21st-century industrial policy. The American experience with industrial policy throughout its history shows that it is beneficial and necessary to have government involvement in technology development and that it is feasible to do so in a manner that encourages rather than constrains innovations by the private sector. The recommendations that follow are crafted with that spirit in mind and are the baseline for American success in the global technology competition. Promote America’s Capacity to Compete The U.S. government needs to take comprehensive and urgent action to lay the groundwork for long-term and comprehensive structural improvements to its science and technology base. There are four categories of recommendations to promote U.S. competitiveness: 1. Increase investments in research and development in the United States. While tech-leading countries around the world have increased their R&D spending, the United States has kept steady as a percentage of GDP for decades. The U.S. share of global R&D fell from 69 percent in 1960 to 28 percent in 2016.83 During that period, the share of R&D investments by the federal government shrank by more than half, meaning that private industry is now driving R&D to a much greater extent. In response, Congress should act by: Raising federal government spending on R&D to at least 2 percent of GDP by 2030, up from around 0.7 percent in 2020. This spending is critically important to maintaining long-term capacity for technological leadership and innovation. The U.S. government remains the largest funder of basic research, which is foundational to game-changing technological achievements.84 Promoting an increase of total national (public and private) R&D expenditures to at least 4.5 percent of GDP by 2030, from under 3 percent in 2020, to keep in line with other leading technology nations. Tax incentives, targeted grants and contracts, and prize competitions all serve to stimulate private-sector investments.

### Link Turn – European Security

#### Turn: Increasing NATO cooperation is imperative – spreading democratic norms, near-perfect HR record, and decades of international peace prove.

Horesh 6/4/22 - Theo Horesh is the author of four books on the psychosocial dynamics of globalization, including The Fascism This Time: And the Global Future of Democracy and a newly revised version of The Holocausts We All Deny: The Crisis Before the Fascism Inferno. He is a democracy advocate who has written hundreds of articles on genocide, climate change, fascism, and human rights. He frequently writes for the Kyiv Post. And he is currently completing his PhD at the University of Leeds, with a thesis on The Retreat from Globalism: And the Reconstruction of the Cosmopolitan Imaginary, [“*NATO’s Role in a Peaceful and Socially Democratic Europe,”* Modern Diplomacy, 6/4/2022, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/04/natos-role-in-a-peaceful-and-socially-democratic-europe/>]RA

NATO brought peace to the most violent continent on the planet by binding its states together in a collective security pact that forbid them from fighting each other and committed them to coming to one another’s defense. In this way, the emphasis on NATO as a hedge against Russian aggression overlooks its role in bringing peace to its member states and gives the false impression of a zero-sum relationship wherein Russia can win only if Europe loses. Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has created a hedge against potential Russian aggression, but it is far from its only purpose. In keeping Europeans from killing one another, NATO opened the continent to trade and the free movement of peoples, thereby paving the way for the European Union, as Timothy Andrew Sayle points out in his epic history of NATO, Enduring Alliance. It made social-democratic institutions like universal health insurance and paid family leave possible by sharing the costs of defense among a multitude of states. It helped spread democracy by demonstrating that democracies are safe and secure, prosperous and peaceful, in their relations with one another. Thus, an ever increasing array of states sought entry into the club of wealthy democracies as a refuge from violence and disorder. And in bringing such a diversity of peoples together, NATO helped transform some of the most militaristic and nationalistic societies in the world into some of its most peaceful and cosmopolitan. In this way, it probably also played a part in transforming colonial regimes like Britain and France, Portugal and Spain, into normal nation states. If the vast majority of us have forgotten what a danger European states were to one another and how militaristic European societies could be, it is largely due to the way collective security arrangements allowed them to let their guards down. Thus, the idea that NATO is an imperialistic military organization bent on expansion misses the point. NATO was always a critical hedge against the Soviet Union, but when the Berlin Wall fell it remained essential to the institutional architecture at the heart of the European Union. Its abandonment would have come coupled with dramatic increases in military budgets and corresponding decreases in social safety net programs. And it would have brought about the remilitarization of Europe’s most vulnerable states, which it would have set on a quest for new protectors, thereby spurring the creation of new power blocks. In so doing, it might have spelled an end to the fledgling European Dream. Of course, collective security pacts also send a signal to would be aggressors that if they ever did attack, they would be up against several states at once, and in the case of NATO dozens. But NATO has been an astonishingly peaceful military pact. Over the course of its near three-quarters of a century existence, it has carried out only three military interventions, a statebuilding mission in Afghanistan, and a small counter-terrorism operation in Iraq. It stopped the Bosnian Genocide, which had already killed well over hundred thousand people, through a limited bombing campaign in 1995, which killed only 27 civilians. It halted the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, which threatened to displace hundreds of thousands of people, through a more extensive bombing campaign in 1999, which according to Human Rights Watch killed up to 529 Serbian civilians. Finally, NATO helped bring down the Gaddafi regime after he embarked on the most intensive killing spree of any leader in the Arab Spring and then threatened to go “door to door” hunting down the rest. According to Libya’s own ambassador to the United Nations, who Secretary General Ban Ki Moon described as begging the U.N. to intervene in an unprecedented display of sobbing before the General Assembly, Gaddafi had just given the signal for his troops to commit genocide. According to Gallup, 75 percent of Libyans told pollsters a year after the intervention that they had wanted NATO to intervene, in spite of the intervention having killed 60 civilians, according to the UN Human Rights council. It was only three years later in 2014, following the degeneration of the world order brought about by Putin’s unanswered theft of the Crimea and Assad’s unanswered obliteration of his own country, that Britain and France would allow the Libyan statebuilding mission to fall apart as the country slipped into civil war. All in all, over the course of its three-quarter century history, NATO military missions were probably directly responsible for less than a thousand civilian deaths spread out over three humanitarian interventions, the vast majority of which involved a state that is now an associate of NATO, which is on track for entry into the European Union in three years. The only other major campaign it engaged in was a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan, where member states mostly helped with statebuilding, police trainings, financial management, and the provision of aid following the United States’ unilateral invasion in 2001. In a remarkable act of coordination, NATO member states each took on a different element of the statebuilding mission in Afghanistan, with only the United Kingdom engaging in heavy fighting in one small province, which they had committed to keeping secure. If these campaigns are remembered as being vastly more violent, and if a narrative has emerged that sees NATO as an expansionist imperial force, it is mostly because NATO missions are often confused in our collective memory with those of the United States and the former empires of Europe. It is also the result of Russian propaganda, which claims a “sphere of influence” tied to its former imperial possessions, many of which have joined NATO. And this points to another misunderstanding about how NATO actually works. Potential members request to join it, and far from being pressured, they have to demonstrate a commitment to democracy and the rule of law if they are to be let in. States have the right to join whatever international associations they want, and spheres of influence are a dated claim seldom invoked today outside of the Putin regime and Trump administration. Meanwhile, states on the periphery of Russia have a better reason for seeking entry into NATO than ever before. Yet, in overlooking the way collective security pacts foster the peaceful relations and prosperity of their member states, we help foster a narrative that sees NATO as an expansionist military organization locked in a zero-sum competition with Russia. Yet, Russians will only win when they establish genuinely democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the domestic respect for human rights. If Putin has overplayed his hand as much as it seems, they might soon find themselves lining up for NATO membership as well. And if that turns out to be the case, it would not be a reason to disband NATO but rather extend the order it has brought to Europe to Russia as well. This vision of a liberal internationalist order, wherein democratic states extend the rule of law and a respect for human rights to an ever increasing array of voluntary members, may appear utopian amid the threats and crimes against humanity of autocrats today. But it is no more fantastic than the “European Dream” of a peaceful continent of democratic states would have appeared at the end of the Second World War. Stranger things have been known to occur than democracy breaking out following the downfall of fascist strongmen and peace breaking out after war.Published 2 weeks ago on June 4, 2022By Theo Horesh

### Link Turn - Cyberterror

#### Turn: NATO key to ward off cyber terrorism

Kupochan 19 – Charles Kupochan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, [*"NATO Is Thriving in Spite of Trump,"* Mar 20, 2019, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump]

A VALUABLE ALLIANCE NATO is entering its eighth decade in quite good health because it succeeds admirably in advancing the shared interests of its members. Russian aggression in Ukraine has brought back into focus NATO’s traditional mission of territorial defense. At its 2016 summit, NATO took the prudent step of deploying combat-ready battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The United States has augmented its presence on the eastern flank, and the Trump administration has agreed to increase spending on European defense and deploy additional U.S. troops on the continent. At its 2018 summit, NATO established two new commands to enhance the security of maritime connections between North America and Europe and improve force mobility within Europe. NATO helped end ethnic conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s and has kept troops there ever since to guard the peace. Despite the difficulties and dangers of the mission in Afghanistan, since 2003 NATO has stayed the course, standing by its first and only invocation of Article 5—the commitment to collective defense—which followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The alliance has contributed significantly to the campaign against the Islamic State (or ISIS), providing surveillance aircraft and helping train Iraqi forces. NATO has deployed ships to the Aegean and the Mediterranean to help provide maritime security and address the migration crisis. In addition to these missions, NATO works continuously to build capacity among its many partners. The Partnership for Peace offers training and exercises to Euro-Atlantic nonmembers. Through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO advises many countries in the broader Middle East, including Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. NATO has cooperation agreements with its global partners, which include Australia, Japan, Korea, and Pakistan. The alliance has already opened the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and is in the midst of establishing a new Cyberspace Operations Centre.

## Internal Link/Impact

### Internal Link Turn – Abandoning NATO wrecks Heg

#### Lack of American leadership in NATO collapses *US hegemony and democracy* – power vacuum and global war!

Berlinski 18 – Claire Berlinski is an American journalist, author, and holds a doctorate in International Relations, [*“Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan,”* Politico, 7/15/2018, [https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/15/trump-nato-europe-history-dependence-219011]RA](https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/15/trump-nato-europe-history-dependence-219011%5dRA)

What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock.

#### Abandonment/unilateralism Wrecks US hegemony – removes *network* of diplomatic and military capabilities and *forecloses agenda-setting power* to new regional blocs

Kaufmann, Hertie School of Governance; Laius, Postdoctorate at Otto Suhr Institute; 17 (Sonja, Mathis, “Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations,” <https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016328716303615)//EF>

The decline of American hegemony has been proclaimed many times, but the US has continued to be the sole superpower on the block. Yet the 2016 election might go down in history as the turning point – if the new administration follows through with its plan to put ‘America First’ and withdraws from international responsibilities. This policy change puts European collective action capacity to a test, leaving the EU to carry on the torch of liberal values and democracy in the global world order. Following the Brexit shock, EU leaders agree on a communications and legitimacy offensive to fend off populist movements in the wake of Brexit. Europe’s foreign policy apparatus evolves. As the EEAS gains experience and fine-tunes its working relationship with member states and the EU Commission, the changes intended by the Lisbon treaty begin to materialize in practical terms. The center of gravity for day-to-day foreign policy moves to the European level, not least because EU mxembers are happy to consolidate expensive foreign operations. At the same time, the United States decrease their footprint in terms of both diplomatic and military capabilities abroad. US foreign policy focuses on core regions and tasks, which means cutting back on large-scale diplomatic initiatives, early warning and conflict resolution, or intelligence analysis. These policy shifts draw heavy criticism from European allies and the transatlantic relationship suffers − also because the new US administration uses a different tone and style towards the old allies. These organizational and strategic changes are reflected in policy choices. In United Nations negotiations on climate change, the EU is the only actor that comes close to China’s willingness and capacity for leadership. Participants in transatlantic working groups discover that their goals are not aligned. In addition, US negotiators are much less enthusiastic about investing political capital and resources in global governance. UN operational budgets across the board are sharply reduced reflecting a reduction in US contributions that cannot be compensated by others. Thus, while the UN remains a forum for deliberation, its agencies lose practical relevance in global governance. At the same time, the member states of the European Union come to terms with the fact that their transatlantic partner seems less willing to assume a leadership role. A number of governments and the foreign-policy institutions in Brussels take on more responsibility in regional and global affairs. As a result, EU policymakers focus more heavily on inter-regional cooperation with organizations from Africa, Latin America and Asia. A number of so-called ‘intensive partnership’ treaties with regional blocs and individual emerging powers address cross-border issues, such as migration and the fight against crime. In trade and investment, regional arrangements increasingly replace the WTO, which is in hibernation due to the United States’ refusal to champion further trade liberalization on a global scale. NATO suffers from funding cuts and is strictly limited to its core mandate for territorial defense, while the UN Security Council drops from gridlock to paralysis. Military interventions still take place – but only based on ad-hoc coalitions. For the EU this means creating a more deeply integrated but still voluntary defense framework with a focus on security in the near abroad and African countries of strategic interest. A first indicator for this scenario is a shift in US foreign policy from a global leadership role to a few selected initiatives. American agenda-setting power on the global stage is reduced as foreign-policy priorities change, but also because European allies in turn focus on other partners and opportunities. EU-internal changes in the institutional setup and practice of foreign policy are another indicator to consider. The clearest sign of this scenario, however, would be bolder and more controversial European actions on the global arena – both diplomatically and militarily.

### Offense – Heg Unsustainable

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner. Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes. The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge. Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork. The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

### Offense – Heg Causes Conflict

#### Liberal hegemony is obsolete – only de-centering US leadership can resolve next-gen prolif and planetary destruction

Sachs 16 (Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Sustainable Development and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, is Director of Columbia’s Center for Sustainable Development and of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, “Learning to Love a Multipolar World,” 12/29, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/multipolar-world-faces-american-resistance-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2016-12)

NEW YORK – American foreign policy is at a crossroads. The United States has been an expanding power since its start in 1789. It battled its way across North America in the nineteenth century and gained global dominance in the second half of the twentieth. But now, facing China’s rise, India’s dynamism, Africa’s soaring populations and economic stirrings, Russia’s refusal to bend to its will, its own inability to control events in the Middle East, and Latin America’s determination to be free of its de facto hegemony, US power has reached its limits. One path for the US is global cooperation. The other is a burst of militarism in response to frustrated ambitions. The future of the US, and of the world, hangs on this choice. Global cooperation is doubly vital. Only cooperation can deliver peace and the escape from a useless, dangerous, and ultimately bankrupting new arms race, this time including cyber-weapons, space weapons, and next-generation nuclear weapons. And only cooperation can enable humanity to face up to urgent planetary challenges, including the destruction of biodiversity, the poisoning of the oceans, and the threat posed by global warming to the world’s food supply, vast drylands, and heavily populated coastal regions. Yet global cooperation means the willingness to reach agreements with other countries, not simply to make unilateral demands of them. And the US is in the habit of making demands, not making compromises. When a state feels destined to rule – as with ancient Rome, the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” centuries ago, the British Empire from 1750 to 1950, and the US since World War II – compromise is hardly a part of its political vocabulary. As former US President George W. Bush succinctly put it, “You’re either with us or against us.”

#### Liberal leadership *incites* global conflict, failed states, and terrorism – downsizing is comparatively safer and resolves their offense

Mearsheimer and Walt 16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)

HEGEMONY'S HOLLOW HOPES Defenders of liberal hegemony marshal a number of unpersuasive arguments to make their case. One familiar claim is that only vigorous U.S. leadership can keep order around the globe. But global leadership is not an end in itself; it is desirable only insofar as it benefits the United States directly. One might further argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to overcome the collective-action problem of local actors failing to balance against a potential hegemon. Offshore balancing recognizes this danger, however, and calls for Washington to step in if needed. Nor does it prohibit Washington from giving friendly states in the key regions advice or material aid. Other defenders of liberal hegemony argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to deal with new, transnational threats that arise from failed states, terrorism, criminal networks, refugee flows, and the like. Not only do the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans offer inadequate protection against these dangers, they claim, but modern military technology also makes it easier for the United States to project power around the world and address them. Today's "global village," in short, is more dangerous yet easier to manage. This view exaggerates these threats and overstates Washington's ability to eliminate them. Crime, terrorism, and similar problems can be a nuisance, but they are hardly existential threats and rarely lend themselves to military solutions. Indeed, constant interference in the affairs of other states-and especially repeated military interventions- generates local resentment and fosters corruption, thereby making these transnational dangers worse. The long-term solution to the problems can only be competent local governance, not heavy-handed U.S. efforts to police the world.

### Offense – Heg is Violent

#### The legacy of American hegemony is endless rivers of blood and feedback loops of sustained conflict **Morefield 19** (Jeanne Morefield, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, Professorial Fellow at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University, PhD from Cornell University, January 8, 2019, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Isn’t the Problem,” Boston Review, <https://bostonreview.net/politics/jeanne-morefield-trump%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-isn%E2%80%99t-problem>) gz






After two years of President Donald Trump, critics and commentators are still struggling to make sense of his foreign policy. Despite some hopes that he might mature into the role of commander in chief, he has continued to thumb his nose at most mainstream academic frameworks for analyzing and conducting foreign policy. Indeed, what makes Trump’s interactions with the rest of the world so confusing is the way he flirts with, and then departs from, the script. He may issue policies and give speeches that include words such as “sovereignty,” “principled realism,” and “peace through strength,” but they frequently appear cheek by jowl with racist rants, crass opportunism, nationalist tirades, and unrestrained militarism. It is this uncomfortable mixture of familiar and jarring that has proven disconcerting for many mainstream international relations scholars, particularly those “intellectual middlemen” who straddle the realms of academia, policy think tanks, and major news outlets. Yet rather than ask how U.S. foreign policy might have contributed to the global environment that made Trump’s election possible, most have responded to the inconsistencies of Trump’s world vision by emphasizing its departure from everything that came before and demanding a return to more familiar times. International relations experts thus express nostalgia for either the “U.S.-led liberal order” or the Cold War while, in outlets such as *Foreign Affairs* and the *New York Times*, they offer selective retellings of the country’s past foreign policies that make them look both shinier and clearer than they were. These responses do not offer much insight into Trump himself, but they do have much to tell us about the discourse of international relations in the United States today and the way its mainstream public analysts—liberals and realists alike—continue to disavow U.S. imperialism. For example, liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that Trump is guilty of endangering the U.S.-led global order. That system, according to Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney, emerged after World War II, when the liberal democracies of the world “joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests,” while simultaneously agreeing, as Ikenberry once put it, to transfer “the reins of power to Washington, just as Hobbes’s individuals . . . voluntarily construct and hand over power to the Leviathan.” The vision of cooperating nation-states may have originated in values that first “emerged in the West,” they argue, but these values have since “become universal.” In this accounting, Trump threatens the stability of U.S. liberal hegemony in two ways: by retreating from multilateral agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal, and by refusing to participate in the narrative of enlightened U.S. leadership. Future great threats to global stability, Ikenberry grumbled, were supposed to come from “hostile revisionist powers seeking to overturn the postwar order.” Now a hostile revisionist power “sits in the Oval Office.” By contrast, when realists such as Stephen Walt or John Mearsheimer criticize Trump, they start from the position that the liberal world order is a delusion, perpetuated most recently by post–Cold War members of the “elite foreign policy establishment.” Walt and others rightly point to the baseline hypocrisy of a “liberal Leviathan,” noting that the current fury over Russian election tampering and cyber espionage rings hollow given the long U.S. reliance on both strategies. This view accompanies a wistful longing for the putatively gimlet-eyed realism of the Cold War, a time when U.S. presidents understood that their role was to deter the Soviet Union, prevent the emergence of dangerous regional hegemons, and preserve “a global balance of power that enhanced American security.” Seen thus, Trump’s hyperbolic and embarrassing nationalism is a symptom of the abandonment of great power politics, while his fawning treatment of Vladimir Putin shatters any remaining hope that his self-styled “principled realism” might take us back to a more strategically realistic time. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, watching the Trump–Putin news conference was like “watching the destruction of a cathedral.” But what is Trump actually doing to destroy this cathedral? What makes Trump’s words and behavior so objectionable? Previous presidents have pulled out of multilateral agreements, entered into disputes with allies, and engaged in protectionism and trade wars. The majority of the Trump administration’s planned and ongoing military deployments are in regions where the military was already deployed by previous administrations in the name of the War on Terror. Moreover, Trump’s national security and national policy statements are littered with the vocabulary of the very experts who find him so terrifying. What, then, makes Trump’s foreign policy such a singular threat? Trump’s foreign policy is disturbing because it is uncanny—both grotesque *and* deeply familiar. Like a funhouse mirror, Trump’s vision of the world reflects back a twisted image of U.S. global politics that *is* and *is not* who we are supposed to be. For instance, deterrence strategy may require the rest of the world to believe that the U.S. president might use nuclear weapons, but the president is *not* supposed to hint that he might actually do so. The president is supposed to be concerned with regulating the flow of immigrants but not reveal that race plays a role in these calculations by blurting the phrase “shithole countries.” The president is supposed to believe that the United States is the most blessed, exceptional country on Earth—as Barack Obama put it, “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being”—but *not* engage in excessive nationalism by making “total allegiance” the “bedrock” of his politics, or combine it with a commitment to “make our Military so big, powerful & strong that no one will mess with us.” Sometimes Trump’s utterances hit so close to home that they surpass uncanniness. In an essay by Sigmund Freud on the uncanny, Freud says dolls and mannequins unsettle precisely because of the possibility that they might actually be alive, a discomfort that has inspired nightmares, works of literature, and horror movies. Trump, by contrast, is a living nightmare. He opens his mouth and the things-which-must-never- be-said simply fall out. Thus, when Bill O’Reilly asked him why he supported Putin even though he is a “killer,” Trump shot back, “There are a lot of killers. You think our country’s so innocent?” Trump’s willingness to say such things has precipitated an existential crisis in the international relations world. U.S. foreign policy, as an academic discourse and political practice, is built on the delicate foundation of what Robert Vitalis has called the “norm against noticing,” This deflective move has long been the gold standard of international relations; under its rules of play, IR experts act as if the United States has never been an imperial power and that its foreign policy is not, and has never been, intentionally racist. The norm against noticing thus distinguishes between the idea of the United States as a necessary world-historical actor and the reality of how the United States acts. In that reality, the United States has long been an imperial power with white nationalist aspirations. Given the racialized nature of U.S. imperial expansion, it makes sense that Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, in a chapter entitled “The Three Races of the United States,” that the United States would one day govern “the destinies of half the globe.” In its early days, while still a slave-holding country, the United States asserted its sovereignty through genocide on a continental scale and annexed large portions of northern Mexico. The country went on to overthrow the independent state of Hawaii, occupied the Philippines and Haiti, exerted its regional power throughout Latin America, expanded its international hegemony after World War II, and became what it is today: the world’s foremost military and nuclear power with a $716 billion “defense” budget that exceeds the spending of all other major global powers combined. “Taking over from the British Empire in the early twentieth-century,” argues James Tully, the United States has used its many military bases located “outside its own borders”—now nearly 800 in over 80 countries— to force open-door economic policies and antidemocratic regimes on states throughout the formerly colonized world. An extremely partial list of sovereign governments that the United States either overthrew or attempted to subvert through military means, assassinations, or election tampering since 1949 includes Syria, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Chile, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Yemen, Australia, Greece, Bolivia, and Angola. Such interventionist policies have contributed substantially to today’s inegalitarian world in which an estimated 783 million people live in profound poverty. In sum, for untold millions of humans in the Global South, the seventy years of worldwide order, security, and prosperity that Ikenberry and Deudney associate with Pax Americana has been anything but ordered, secure, or prosperous. And yet the norm against noticing prevents foreign policy analysis from even acknowledging—let alone grappling with—the relationship between race and imperialism that has characterized U.S. international relations from the country’s earliest days. This regime of politely un-seeing—of deflecting—connections between U.S. foreign policy, race hierarchy, and colonial administration was clearly not in effect when *Foreign Affairs* was released under its original name: the *Journal of Race Development*. This began to change, however, in the 1920s. Among other contributing factors, World War I, the rise of anti-colonial revolutions, and the emergence of liberal internationalism as a popular ideology helped convince foreign policy experts in the United States and Europe to adopt a policy language oriented toward “development” rather than imperialism or racial difference. Mainstream international relations scholarship today remains committed to a narrative in which the discipline itself and U.S. foreign policy has always been and remains race blind, concerned solely with the relationship between sovereign states who cooperate, deter, or compete with one another in a global system in which the United States is simply, like Caesar, the “first citizen” (Ikenberry) or “the luckiest great power in modern history” (Walt). For liberals, this involves a studied erasure of the imperial origins of twentieth-century internationalism in the League of Nations’ Mandate system and the complicity of Woodrow Wilson in preserving, as Adom Getachew puts it, “white supremacy on a global scale.” For realists, it requires both forgetting the anti-Enlightenment origins of postwar realist thought and reinserting the “security dilemma” back into history so that, with the help of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, the world can—as Slavoj Žižek says—“become what it always was.” International relations experts will acknowledge U.S. violence and overreach when necessary, but routinely read the illiberalism of U.S. foreign policy as an exception that is not at all representative, in Anne Marie Slaughter’s words, of “the idea that is America.” Slaughter, with Ikenberry, can consider bad behavior only briefly and only in the service of insisting that what matters most is not what the United States actually does with its power but what it intends to do. Yes, “imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history,” Ikenberry and Deudney argue, but what matters is that liberalism “has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices.” Indeed, even those public intellectuals such as Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff who, after September 11, called for the United States to embrace its status as an imperial power, framed their arguments in deflective, liberal terms. By contrast, because realists project the security dilemma retroactively into history (while also simultaneously excising imperialism) they can only see the U.S. destabilization of Third World economies, assassinations, and secret bombings as tragic necessities (great powers, claims Mearsheimer, “have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system”) or as the result of liberals’ ill-advised desire to force “our” values on other nations. Both of these deflective strategies reinforce the illusion that we live, in Nikhil Pal Singh’s words, in an “American-centered, racially inclusive world, one organized around formally equal and independent nation states” where some states just happen to have more power than others, and where the alternative—Russian or Chinese hegemony—is too frightening even to contemplate. That deflection would play such an outsized role in supporting the ideological edifice of international relations today is hardly surprising. Turn-of-the-century British liberals who supported their empire also drew upon a variety of different deflective strategies to reconcile the violence and illiberalism of British imperial expansion with the stated liberal goals of the Empire. Such deflection made it impossible for these thinkers—many of whom would go on to work as some of the first international relations scholars in Britain and help found The Royal Institute of International Affairs—to link the problems of empire with the violence and disruption of imperialism. Similarly, deflection within international relations today obscures the U.S. role in maintaining the profoundly hierarchical, racist, insecure, deeply unjust reality of the current global order. It also makes it impossible to address how U.S. foreign policy (covert and overt) has contributed to the destabilization of that order by creating the circumstances that give rise to “failed states,” “rogue regimes,” and “sponsors of terrorism.” Moreover, it impedes any theorizing about how the widespread appeal of Trump’s xenophobia at home might, in part, be the product of U.S. foreign policy abroad, the bitter fruit of the War on Terror and its equally violent predecessors. In other words, in the grand tradition of liberal empire, U.S. foreign policy deflection actively disrupts the link between cause and effect that an entire science of international relations was created to explain. What makes Trump’s attitude toward foreign policy so uniquely unhinging for international relations experts, then, is the fact that it is essentially undeflectable. When he explains to Theresa May that refugees threaten European culture or calls Mexican immigrants killers, he lays bare the meant-to-be unutterable fear of nonwhite migration that has haunted British, U.S., and European imperialists and foreign policy experts for over a century. When he summons the fires of nationalism to demand an unprecedented increase in the military budget, and then gets it with the overwhelming support of House and Senate Democrats, he reveals that constitutional checks on the commander in chief are only as good as the willingness of Congress to resist jingoism. When he calls nations populated by brown and black people shitholes, he openly advertises the unspoken white supremacist edge that has informed U.S. economic, development, energy, and foreign policies since the late nineteenth century. Trump’s Muslim ban is simply the War on Terror on steroids. In short, Trump’s foreign policy is unprecedented not because of what it does, but because Trump will openly say what it does—and because of what that then says about us as a nation. The discomfort Trump provokes ought to prompt international relations experts to reflect on the failings of their discipline to reckon with the relationship between U.S. imperialism, U.S. foreign policy, and the constellation of xenophobia, militarism, racism, and nationalism that haunts our days. The fields of intellectual and legal history and political theory are far ahead of international relations in their critical interrogation of the ideologies that sustain empire at home and abroad. In addition, Trump’s election has emboldened activists to make increasingly explicit the connections they see between a racialized, anti-immigrant politics of domestic dispossession and violence and the history of U.S. imperialism in the world. Unfortunately the same does not appear to be true for the majority of intellectual middlemen who set the public tone for U.S. foreign policy. Trump is, finally, both the emperor with no clothes and the pointing child, begging to hold a big military parade so we can collectively acknowledge the naked imperialist power at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. Trump practically screams at the United States to look at itself. And yet, the more he screams, the more the intellectual enablers avert their eyes. They are busy looking elsewhere—anywhere really—except at that nakedness.

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### Defense – Multipolarity

#### Their impact is non-unique: Multipolarity is inevitable --- but it’s currently a peaceful transition

Siddiqui 21 - Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist, specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, U.K.. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and U.K., [1, 1-25-2021, "*Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies*," World Financial Review, [https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/]RA](https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/%5dRA), charts included!

IV. Growth of Regional Economy Although a significant share of East Asia’s trade is in intermediate manufactured goods for final destination export to the USA, Europe and Japan, it has allowed for technology transfers and has stimulated endogenous growth factors in East Asia region. The other dimension is regionalisation and the intensification of transnational trade and investment flows among the developing countries. Regionalisation has been an important feature of East Asian re-emergence. Initiated by the relocation of Japanese manufacturing capacities in the 1980s, which generated a concatenated division of labour in East Asia, regional economic integration has deepened over the past decade and a half. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade has thus risen constantly over past decades by 20% in 1970, 32% in the early 1980s, 47% in the early 1995, 54.8% in 2000 and nearly 60% in 2012. The Chinese government appears to be only focusing on building its economy and the living conditions of its people. China has become the world’s largest economy, but it has a population of 1.4 billion, which is more than four times larger than the US. Having an economy the size of the US means that average living standards are far lower than in the US and at present, per capita income is one-fourth than of the US. It means that China still has a long way to go to become a rich country. Chinese annual GDP growth averaged over 9% between 1997 and 2019 and, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, trade and investment flows between China and the rest of Asia grew significantly. Since the late 1990s, regional trade with China has been growing faster than with the US. For instance, Japan’s imports from China already exceed those from the US, and Japanese exports to China have been steadily rising. This same trend is apparent in South Korean, Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean trade flows (Amsden, 2001; Siddiqui, 2020a). Chinese leaders thus interpret the 1997 East Asian financial crisis as a turning point: ‘The process of the East Asian cooperation has been consolidated day by day since then [and is now] based on a multi-layered, multi-faceted structure’. Recent moves to gradually internationalise the Renminbi and use it in regional transactions, such as the June 2012 Japanese–Chinese accord to trade in their currencies rather than the dollar, represent a further step in this direction. (Siddiqui, 2020d) Trade between China and all other developing countries grew significantly over the past two decades. While the share of South America, Africa and South Asia in China’s total trade remains relatively small, it is steadily growing, but China’s share in their total trade has become strategically important. The space is not available for a comprehensive review of the new transcontinental flows, but the pattern is clear even when we look at the data. Over the past two decades Asia has become Brazil’s main trading partner, accounting for 30% of its exports and 31% of its imports. Exports to China, as a share of total exports, have risen from 0.9% in 1992 to over 17%. China has thus become Brazil’s second trading partner, just behind the European Union (21%) but well ahead of the US (10%). Argentina’s exports to China, as a share of total exports, have likewise risen from 1.1% to 9.7%. Similar patterns are apparent for Africa, where South Africa’s export share to China has risen from 1.8% in 1998 to over 12% in 2018, while imports rose from 3% to 15%, and Nigeria’s exports from 0.5% to 6.9%. In South Asia the share of Indian exports to China has risen from 2.9% to over 10%, and imports from 2% to 12% during the same period. V. Restructuring Global Capitalism It seems that the historic pendulum, which had swung to the ‘West’ in the late 18th century, is swinging back to Asia, which is reclaiming the leading economic role it held for a very long period before the Age of the Western Empire. The movement towards a polycentric and plural world system has indeed quickened over the past quarter century, as major Asian regions have consolidated their position as a dynamic growth region of the world capitalist economy, developing regional and transcontinental linkages that are reconfiguring global trade, investment and financial flows. First in the 1960s, economic changes began in the East Asian region and later on in the 1990s, growth spread to other developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. The systemic restructuring has primarily been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion, the duration of which have been remarkable by historic standards. Beginning with Japan’s rapid economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional development dynamic was set into motion that spread successively, in wave-like formations, to the Newly Industrialised Countries and moreover, over the last four decades, to spectacular growth in China. Varying initial conditions, historic pathways and a combination of both state and markets have produced positive results in East Asia. There are uneven country-to-country developmental outcomes, distinguishing first and second wave industrialising from third and fourth wave countries that are climbing the ladder but are not far from catching-up with the most developed economies. (Siddiqui, 2020c) Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. Nonetheless, a coherent process has been at work, unfolding over time and space to most of the region, with global effects. East Asia’s aggregate share of constantly increasing world GDP (in PPP), which was negligible in the 1950s, has thus risen from around 10% in 1980 to 30% in 2015. China’s share has grown from 2% to over 18%. Over the same time period PPP per capita GDP in current international dollars was multiplied by 14 in South Korea, by over seven in Singapore and Thailand, by six in Malaysia and Indonesia, and by 39 in China (from US$250 to US$9380 in 2019)–a spectacular increase that reflects the intensity of growth and its cumulative impact. By the end of 2020 East Asia’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to reach 32%, with China accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In South Asia, India’s world share has risen from 2.5% to 5.5%, and per-capita GDP has increased by a factor of 14, from $419 dollars to $3800 dollars today (in current US dollars). Asia’s aggregate share of world GDP (in PPP) is thus projected to approach 46% in a few years. When other major re-emerging countries and world regions – Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa are taken into account, despite the Covid-19 setback, their world output share in 2020 is expected to exceed 55%. Over the past two decades, East Asia region has thus been the main source of world growth and has emerged as increasingly trade and investment linkages. Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. We are witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries in Europe, North America and Japan. (Siddiqui, 2019a; also Siddiqui, 2012b) The hierarchical international system constructed in the last three hundred years, that was centred in Europe, and which instituted a global division of labour dividing the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries, is giving way to a multi-polar world. In fact, the USA’s Cold War strategy required a few regions of secure and prosperous states in Northeast Asia to contain the Soviet Union and China, until the late 1960s Sino-Soviet border tension, and to minimise any possibility of radical movement in the region. (Siddiqui, 2017b) This is also true of China, which, because of its scale, nonetheless constitutes a special case. Gradual integration into the world capitalist economy and export-led industrialisation modelled on the neo-mercantilist strategies of earlier East Asian developmental states has generated intense growth and real GDP gains over long periods. The capitalist transformation has simultaneously led to spatial polarisation, large-scale continental mass migrations, sharp new social stratifications and major problems of environmental sustainability linked to energy use and urbanisation. Sustained growth, fuelled by transnational investment flows, has been made possible by the mobilisation and exploitation of a vast subordinate labour force, notably women concentrated in low value-added activities, raising crucial issues of gender and class. While they highlight the need for vigorous corrective measures, without which a country’s development is likely to be compromised, these problems do not call into question the fact that the strategy followed since 1978 has been broadly successful. China’s pathway bears some analogies to US economic expansion in the 19th century, which was fostered by transnational flows and relied on the exploitation of slave labour until the mid-19th century, and of low wage immigrant labour in the latter part of the century. This comparison is not meant to justify disciplinary Chinese labour policies, although there are currently some signs of relaxation, much less the authoritarian regime that is engineering capitalist transformation. It merely points to the fact that China, through the exploitation of its rural and most backward regions, is following the path of earlier successful European Capitalism. Soon after the communist revolution in China in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges, seeking to overcome severe underdevelopment, widespread malnutrition and illiteracy, and the Western monopoly over technology. It promoted reforms to encourage growth and economic development such as the government’s introduction of radical land reforms, compulsory primary education, and the availability of primary health care for all its citizens. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the ‘open policy towards the West’ expressed this as: “Our country must develop. If we do not develop then we must be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.” China’s political orientation has been shaped by its history of subjugation by foreign powers since the mid-19th century, also known as the “century of humiliation”, and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation. In the 1950s and 1960s, China extended support to developing countries due to the collective struggle of formerly colonised and oppressed nations against global inequality brought by the West. Four decades later, the success of the Chinese economic reform is undeniable, and it is even noted that such a rapid economic transformation has never happened in human history in such a short period. According to the World Bank, China has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, more than ever happened in human history, and generated “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”. China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% annually for over forty years, without crises, with the country becoming a world leader in manufacturing, technology and innovation. In mater of just two life spans, from being extremely poor to an international power, China is now predicted to overtake the US in GDP terms in the next fifteen years. Measured in terms of PPP, China’s economy already surpassed the US in 2018. Since the last decade, the US-China trade imbalance has been rising against the US as shown in Figure 1. The US has blamed China and claimed it is due to the Chinese policy of currency manipulation. (Siddiqui, 2020b) After Donald Trump became President of the US in 2017, he initiated a rise in tariffs against certain Chinese products and also threatened more trade sanctions against China and Russia. However, a number of studies have pointed out that the US trade deficit rose not only with China but with Europe and Japan as well (see Figure 2). Therefore, the persistence of trade imbalances trends must be seen as a US domestic policy, rather than putting the blame on others. I argue that a disparity in real costs is the root cause of the US-China trade imbalance. Figure 1, which shows the trade in goods between the US and China, indicates that the US has had trade deficits in goods with China since the early 1990s, which has grown substantially. For example, the deficit was only US$10 billion in 1990, but by 2000 had reached US$100 billion; by 2005 it had risen further to US$200 billion, by 2012 it was US$ 315 billion, and by 2017 it had reached US$376 billion. The sharpest rise was since 2001, which also coincided with China joining the WTO. For example, China’s exports to the US increased from US$125 billion to US$505 billion, while US exports to China increased only US$19 billion to about US$130 billion for the same period. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Figure-1-United-States-%E2%80%93-China-Trade-in-Goods.jpg) Figure 2 indicates that China is an important trading partner for the US, but that China still has less than half of the US’s overall trade deficits. For example, in 2017 the US’s trade deficit with China was US$ 375 billion; however, its overall trade deficit was US$ 775 billion. This means that even if the US were to eliminate its trade deficit with China, its trade imbalance problems would still exist. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Figure-2-United-States-Trade-Deficit-with-all-Trading-Partners-1985-201.jpg) The US trade deficit and also external payments kept on rising as shown in Figure 3, and has grown remarkably over the last two decades. This was coincident with the period when China joined WTO, which appears to have given the US an excuse to blame China for raising its trade deficits. The US trade deficit with China and other countries are shown in Figure 2. Since 1990, the labour and total factor productivity in the advanced economies has witnessed negative growth, while in the emerging economies including China it has grown steadily, as indicated in Figure 5. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Fig-3Trends.jpg) The US-China trade war has facilitated the establishment of Russia as China’s top strategic partner. This also led Russian oil to be redirected from European countries to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in Russia in 2019 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries signed to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the Rouble and Renminbi, bypassing the US dollar. (Siddiqui, 2020d) [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/fig-4-multipolar.jpg) As China overtook the US as the worlds’ largest economy, a multi-polar world could be a welcome development for all, especially the developing countries. According to Fortune 2018, among global 500 top businesses, the China has moved into second position only behind the US (see Figure 4). The IMF has said that in 2019 China displaced the US as the world’s largest economy. The IMF’s estimation is made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, meaning that it takes into account the differing prices in both countries. Therefore, if at present 1 US$ is worth Chinese 6.1 Renminbi on the foreign exchange market, it means that 6.1 Renminbi can buy much more in China than one dollar can buy in the US market. Hence, the PPP comparison makes adjustments for this, and this is why the Chinese economy is much larger than the measure most commonly used by international organisations and media, which simply converts China’s GDP to US dollars at the official exchange rate. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Figure-5-A-Long-Term-View-of-Total-Factor-Productivity-Growth-1950-2014..jpg) China is playing a very assertive and leading role in global affairs. It has launched the trillions of dollars on ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – called “the largest single infrastructure programme in human history.” The BRI involves over 70 countries and 1700 developmental projects, connecting Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America (Siddiqui, 2019c), while the US is facing economic stagnation and decline, and is losing international control. The US President Donald Trump in 2019 increased military spending rapidly to US$ 716 billion and has brought into his cabinet extreme hawks and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Pompeo and Peter Navarro. For US policy makers and elites, rather than accepting this new challenge, they see it as a threat to their world domination, and have formulated a recent policy known as the “containing China” policy. Similarly, three-quarters of a century earlier, the US took over as the leader of the capitalist world, declared the Soviet Union as its main enemy, and began an arms race with the Soviet Union. However, at that time the Soviet economy was one-quarter of the size of the US. But now the situation is very different, the Chinese economy is currently bigger than the US and also has huge amounts of trade and a current account surplus. Even after the Covid-19 set back, the Chinese economy has not only recovered, but began growing into the fastest economy in the world. Moreover, China has emerged as the top investor country in the world in recent years. China is a rising power, but they do not seem to be interested in building an empire. For example, China’s billon US dollar investment commitment to ‘one belt one road’, and it becoming the largest investor in Africa, while the West has still not recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and the more recent Covid-19 epidemic. It seems that due to the long-term consequences of the COVID crisis, public debt in most developed economies will rise sharply. In fact, the 2008 financial crisis increased government debt in the US and EU. (Siddiqui, 2020c; also Siddiqui, 2019b) We think of the financial crisis as a temporary shock that the developed economies barely recovered from, but as we look at the current crisis, it will increase government debt greatly compared to the GDP. This is a legacy that will remain for a long time and will pose very pressing policy questions. As we think about the future of developed economies, in the US and EU, we have to ask ourselves how we will be dealing with a level of government debt that will exceed, as a share of GDP, the amount we had at the end of World War II. The management of this new massive debt through the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis will shape Western society, determining the economic balance between generations, the actual opportunities for future generations, and the technological disruption and transformation that was already in place before this outbreak. VI. Conclusion As we have discussed, the new globalisation cycle that began in the late 20th century has led to an unexpectedly rapid, albeit still incomplete, rebalancing between emerging and advanced economies. East Asia has been the main driver of a systemic change that is leading to new transnational linkages between Asia, Africa and Latin America. These new patterns of interaction are part of a broad process of gradual decentring and restructuring of the world economy that, at the political level, is leading to a diffusion of power. Domestic or international events, for instance a hypothetical but not unthinkable Chinese overreach in the South China Sea leading to sustained inter-state tensions, might slow but are unlikely to halt a transformation that is embedded in globalisation and has become one of its driving forces. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. But unlike the first generation of postcolonial leaders, who aimed for revolution or sought to invent a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and communism, and the framers of the NIEO who challenged the intellectual and material foundations of the post-1945 world order, the actors of the current shift in global power relations are claiming a central competitive place in the world capitalist system that their predecessors had attempted to either reform or supplant. (Dos Santos, 1970) The success of that claim, and their consequent implications for current and future global system management, has dampened and in some cases entirely submerged the broader emancipatory or universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for independence, equality and justice. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. It has now been sixty-five years since the historic Bandung Conference of 1955, rightly regarded as a milestone in the formation of SSC as a global political movement. The SSC as a movement intended to challenge the Northern-dominated political and economic system and, from the 1950s to the present, has been through a series of starts and stops, surges and retreats. As expressed at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955, the newly decolonised countries of the global South emphasised economic and political cooperation, human rights, and the promotion of world peace. This emergent movement of solidarity among the developing countries thereby sought to challenge global power relations. The ‘Bandung Spirit’ henceforth came to encapsulate policies of non-interference and developing economic cooperation among the former colonies to end global inequality while lessening their economic and political dependence on the West. While Bandung and the NAM embodied the political dimensions, the Group of 77, named after the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called for the establishment of a NIEO. The NIEO was to be achieved through tackling structural unequal exchanges through ‘a just and equitable relationship’ between the goods exported by developing countries and the goods imported, with an emphasis on sovereignty over natural resources and the right to nationalise key industries and to formulate their own domestic economic policies as sovereign nations. By the 1980s, however, the developing countries’ debt crisis and the rise of neoliberalism had served to eclipse the NIEO project. The retreat of developing countries’ solidarity was given no clearer indication than at the 1992 UNCTAD summit, when UNCTAD dropped its demands for the adjustment of the international patent system to the developmental needs of the global South, and adopted a statement expressing the belief that the adoption of adequate and effective International Patent Protections and related efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would facilitate technological transfers to developing countries. Henceforth, UNCTAD had been sidelined by GATT, and its successor the WTO. The study finds that people have nothing to fear from a multi-polar world. And today it seems that the time is ripe for emerging economies to stand up and demand a greater role in the international arena related to the formulation of politics and economics, and in support of its historic promise to transform the world order. There has been a historically significant global shift in production and manufacturing from the advanced economies to the emerging economies, altering the economic geography of the world. The tendency over the past several decades to greatly intensify the globalisation of production, trade and financial flows was advocated primarily as a systemic solution to underlying structural problems in the international political economy, including growth, terms of trade, and productivity. But these same globalising tendencies have also enhanced the historical potential of economic growth and industrialisation in the emerging economies, although currently limited to only a few regions, but expected to spread in the coming decades.

#### Multipolarity coming now despite Covid – intraregional trade, investments, and globalization prove.

* Short version of the above card!

Siddiqui 21 - Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist, specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, U.K.. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and U.K., [1, 1-25-2021, "*Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies*," World Financial Review, https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/]RA

IV. Growth of Regional Economy Although a significant share of East Asia’s trade is in intermediate manufactured goods for final destination export to the USA, Europe and Japan, it has allowed for technology transfers and has stimulated endogenous growth factors in East Asia region. The other dimension is regionalisation and the intensification of transnational trade and investment flows among the developing countries. Regionalisation has been an important feature of East Asian re-emergence. Initiated by the relocation of Japanese manufacturing capacities in the 1980s, which generated a concatenated division of labour in East Asia, regional economic integration has deepened over the past decade and a half. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade has thus risen constantly over past decades by 20% in 1970, 32% in the early 1980s, 47% in the early 1995, 54.8% in 2000 and nearly 60% in 2012. The Chinese government appears to be only focusing on building its economy and the living conditions of its people. China has become the world’s largest economy, but it has a population of 1.4 billion, which is more than four times larger than the US. Having an economy the size of the US means that average living standards are far lower than in the US and at present, per capita income is one-fourth than of the US. It means that China still has a long way to go to become a rich country. Chinese annual GDP growth averaged over 9% between 1997 and 2019 and, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, trade and investment flows between China and the rest of Asia grew significantly. Since the late 1990s, regional trade with China has been growing faster than with the US. For instance, Japan’s imports from China already exceed those from the US, and Japanese exports to China have been steadily rising. This same trend is apparent in South Korean, Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean trade flows (Amsden, 2001; Siddiqui, 2020a). Chinese leaders thus interpret the 1997 East Asian financial crisis as a turning point: ‘The process of the East Asian cooperation has been consolidated day by day since then [and is now] based on a multi-layered, multi-faceted structure’. Recent moves to gradually internationalise the Renminbi and use it in regional transactions, such as the June 2012 Japanese–Chinese accord to trade in their currencies rather than the dollar, represent a further step in this direction. (Siddiqui, 2020d) Trade between China and all other developing countries grew significantly over the past two decades. While the share of South America, Africa and South Asia in China’s total trade remains relatively small, it is steadily growing, but China’s share in their total trade has become strategically important. The space is not available for a comprehensive review of the new transcontinental flows, but the pattern is clear even when we look at the data. Over the past two decades Asia has become Brazil’s main trading partner, accounting for 30% of its exports and 31% of its imports. Exports to China, as a share of total exports, have risen from 0.9% in 1992 to over 17%. China has thus become Brazil’s second trading partner, just behind the European Union (21%) but well ahead of the US (10%). Argentina’s exports to China, as a share of total exports, have likewise risen from 1.1% to 9.7%. Similar patterns are apparent for Africa, where South Africa’s export share to China has risen from 1.8% in 1998 to over 12% in 2018, while imports rose from 3% to 15%, and Nigeria’s exports from 0.5% to 6.9%. In South Asia the share of Indian exports to China has risen from 2.9% to over 10%, and imports from 2% to 12% during the same period. V. Restructuring Global Capitalism It seems that the historic pendulum, which had swung to the ‘West’ in the late 18th century, is swinging back to Asia, which is reclaiming the leading economic role it held for a very long period before the Age of the Western Empire. The movement towards a polycentric and plural world system has indeed quickened over the past quarter century, as major Asian regions have consolidated their position as a dynamic growth region of the world capitalist economy, developing regional and transcontinental linkages that are reconfiguring global trade, investment and financial flows. First in the 1960s, economic changes began in the East Asian region and later on in the 1990s, growth spread to other developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. The systemic restructuring has primarily been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion, the duration of which have been remarkable by historic standards. Beginning with Japan’s rapid economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional development dynamic was set into motion that spread successively, in wave-like formations, to the Newly Industrialised Countries and moreover, over the last four decades, to spectacular growth in China. Varying initial conditions, historic pathways and a combination of both state and markets have produced positive results in East Asia. There are uneven country-to-country developmental outcomes, distinguishing first and second wave industrialising from third and fourth wave countries that are climbing the ladder but are not far from catching-up with the most developed economies. (Siddiqui, 2020c) Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. Nonetheless, a coherent process has been at work, unfolding over time and space to most of the region, with global effects. East Asia’s aggregate share of constantly increasing world GDP (in PPP), which was negligible in the 1950s, has thus risen from around 10% in 1980 to 30% in 2015. China’s share has grown from 2% to over 18%. Over the same time period PPP per capita GDP in current international dollars was multiplied by 14 in South Korea, by over seven in Singapore and Thailand, by six in Malaysia and Indonesia, and by 39 in China (from US$250 to US$9380 in 2019)–a spectacular increase that reflects the intensity of growth and its cumulative impact. By the end of 2020 East Asia’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to reach 32%, with China accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In South Asia, India’s world share has risen from 2.5% to 5.5%, and per-capita GDP has increased by a factor of 14, from $419 dollars to $3800 dollars today (in current US dollars). Asia’s aggregate share of world GDP (in PPP) is thus projected to approach 46% in a few years. When other major re-emerging countries and world regions – Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa are taken into account, despite the Covid-19 setback, their world output share in 2020 is expected to exceed 55%. Over the past two decades, East Asia region has thus been the main source of world growth and has emerged as increasingly trade and investment linkages. Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. We are witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries in Europe, North America and Japan. (Siddiqui, 2019a; also Siddiqui, 2012b) The hierarchical international system constructed in the last three hundred years, that was centred in Europe, and which instituted a global division of labour dividing the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries, is giving way to a multi-polar world. In fact, the USA’s Cold War strategy required a few regions of secure and prosperous states in Northeast Asia to contain the Soviet Union and China, until the late 1960s Sino-Soviet border tension, and to minimise any possibility of radical movement in the region. (Siddiqui, 2017b) This is also true of China, which, because of its scale, nonetheless constitutes a special case. Gradual integration into the world capitalist economy and export-led industrialisation modelled on the neo-mercantilist strategies of earlier East Asian developmental states has generated intense growth and real GDP gains over long periods. The capitalist transformation has simultaneously led to spatial polarisation, large-scale continental mass migrations, sharp new social stratifications and major problems of environmental sustainability linked to energy use and urbanisation. Sustained growth, fuelled by transnational investment flows, has been made possible by the mobilisation and exploitation of a vast subordinate labour force, notably women concentrated in low value-added activities, raising crucial issues of gender and class. While they highlight the need for vigorous corrective measures, without which a country’s development is likely to be compromised, these problems do not call into question the fact that the strategy followed since 1978 has been broadly successful. China’s pathway bears some analogies to US economic expansion in the 19th century, which was fostered by transnational flows and relied on the exploitation of slave labour until the mid-19th century, and of low wage immigrant labour in the latter part of the century. This comparison is not meant to justify disciplinary Chinese labour policies, although there are currently some signs of relaxation, much less the authoritarian regime that is engineering capitalist transformation. It merely points to the fact that China, through the exploitation of its rural and most backward regions, is following the path of earlier successful European Capitalism. Soon after the communist revolution in China in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges, seeking to overcome severe underdevelopment, widespread malnutrition and illiteracy, and the Western monopoly over technology. It promoted reforms to encourage growth and economic development such as the government’s introduction of radical land reforms, compulsory primary education, and the availability of primary health care for all its citizens. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the ‘open policy towards the West’ expressed this as: “Our country must develop. If we do not develop then we must be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.” China’s political orientation has been shaped by its history of subjugation by foreign powers since the mid-19th century, also known as the “century of humiliation”, and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation. In the 1950s and 1960s, China extended support to developing countries due to the collective struggle of formerly colonised and oppressed nations against global inequality brought by the West. Four decades later, the success of the Chinese economic reform is undeniable, and it is even noted that such a rapid economic transformation has never happened in human history in such a short period. According to the World Bank, China has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, more than ever happened in human history, and generated “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”. China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% annually for over forty years, without crises, with the country becoming a world leader in manufacturing, technology and innovation. In mater of just two life spans, from being extremely poor to an international power, China is now predicted to overtake the US in GDP terms in the next fifteen years. Measured in terms of PPP, China’s economy already surpassed the US in 2018. Since the last decade, the US-China trade imbalance has been rising against the US as shown in Figure 1. The US has blamed China and claimed it is due to the Chinese policy of currency manipulation. (Siddiqui, 2020b) After Donald Trump became President of the US in 2017, he initiated a rise in tariffs against certain Chinese products and also threatened more trade sanctions against China and Russia. However, a number of studies have pointed out that the US trade deficit rose not only with China but with Europe and Japan as well (see Figure 2). Therefore, the persistence of trade imbalances trends must be seen as a US domestic policy, rather than putting the blame on others. I argue that a disparity in real costs is the root cause of the US-China trade imbalance. Figure 1, which shows the trade in goods between the US and China, indicates that the US has had trade deficits in goods with China since the early 1990s, which has grown substantially. For example, the deficit was only US$10 billion in 1990, but by 2000 had reached US$100 billion; by 2005 it had risen further to US$200 billion, by 2012 it was US$ 315 billion, and by 2017 it had reached US$376 billion. The sharpest rise was since 2001, which also coincided with China joining the WTO. For example, China’s exports to the US increased from US$125 billion to US$505 billion, while US exports to China increased only US$19 billion to about US$130 billion for the same period. [figure omitted] Figure 2 indicates that China is an important trading partner for the US, but that China still has less than half of the US’s overall trade deficits. For example, in 2017 the US’s trade deficit with China was US$ 375 billion; however, its overall trade deficit was US$ 775 billion. This means that even if the US were to eliminate its trade deficit with China, its trade imbalance problems would still exist. [figure omitted] The US trade deficit and also external payments kept on rising as shown in Figure 3, and has grown remarkably over the last two decades. This was coincident with the period when China joined WTO, which appears to have given the US an excuse to blame China for raising its trade deficits. The US trade deficit with China and other countries are shown in Figure 2. Since 1990, the labour and total factor productivity in the advanced economies has witnessed negative growth, while in the emerging economies including China it has grown steadily, as indicated in Figure 5. [figure omitted] The US-China trade war has facilitated the establishment of Russia as China’s top strategic partner. This also led Russian oil to be redirected from European countries to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in Russia in 2019 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries signed to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the Rouble and Renminbi, bypassing the US dollar. (Siddiqui, 2020d) [Figure Omitted] As China overtook the US as the worlds’ largest economy, a multi-polar world could be a welcome development for all, especially the developing countries. According to Fortune 2018, among global 500 top businesses, the China has moved into second position only behind the US (see Figure 4). The IMF has said that in 2019 China displaced the US as the world’s largest economy. The IMF’s estimation is made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, meaning that it takes into account the differing prices in both countries. Therefore, if at present 1 US$ is worth Chinese 6.1 Renminbi on the foreign exchange market, it means that 6.1 Renminbi can buy much more in China than one dollar can buy in the US market. 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For US policy makers and elites, rather than accepting this new challenge, they see it as a threat to their world domination, and have formulated a recent policy known as the “containing China” policy. Similarly, three-quarters of a century earlier, the US took over as the leader of the capitalist world, declared the Soviet Union as its main enemy, and began an arms race with the Soviet Union. However, at that time the Soviet economy was one-quarter of the size of the US. But now the situation is very different, the Chinese economy is currently bigger than the US and also has huge amounts of trade and a current account surplus. Even after the Covid-19 set back, the Chinese economy has not only recovered, but began growing into the fastest economy in the world. Moreover, China has emerged as the top investor country in the world in recent years. China is a rising power, but they do not seem to be interested in building an empire. 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As we think about the future of developed economies, in the US and EU, we have to ask ourselves how we will be dealing with a level of government debt that will exceed, as a share of GDP, the amount we had at the end of World War II. The management of this new massive debt through the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis will shape Western society, determining the economic balance between generations, the actual opportunities for future generations, and the technological disruption and transformation that was already in place before this outbreak. VI. Conclusion As we have discussed, the new globalisation cycle that began in the late 20th century has led to an unexpectedly rapid, albeit still incomplete, rebalancing between emerging and advanced economies. East Asia has been the main driver of a systemic change that is leading to new transnational linkages between Asia, Africa and Latin America. These new patterns of interaction are part of a broad process of gradual decentring and restructuring of the world economy that, at the political level, is leading to a diffusion of power. Domestic or international events, for instance a hypothetical but not unthinkable Chinese overreach in the South China Sea leading to sustained inter-state tensions, might slow but are unlikely to halt a transformation that is embedded in globalisation and has become one of its driving forces. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. But unlike the first generation of postcolonial leaders, who aimed for revolution or sought to invent a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and communism, and the framers of the NIEO who challenged the intellectual and material foundations of the post-1945 world order, the actors of the current shift in global power relations are claiming a central competitive place in the world capitalist system that their predecessors had attempted to either reform or supplant. (Dos Santos, 1970) The success of that claim, and their consequent implications for current and future global system management, has dampened and in some cases entirely submerged the broader emancipatory or universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for independence, equality and justice. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. 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The ‘Bandung Spirit’ henceforth came to encapsulate policies of non-interference and developing economic cooperation among the former colonies to end global inequality while lessening their economic and political dependence on the West. While Bandung and the NAM embodied the political dimensions, the Group of 77, named after the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called for the establishment of a NIEO. The NIEO was to be achieved through tackling structural unequal exchanges through ‘a just and equitable relationship’ between the goods exported by developing countries and the goods imported, with an emphasis on sovereignty over natural resources and the right to nationalise key industries and to formulate their own domestic economic policies as sovereign nations. By the 1980s, however, the developing countries’ debt crisis and the rise of neoliberalism had served to eclipse the NIEO project. The retreat of developing countries’ solidarity was given no clearer indication than at the 1992 UNCTAD summit, when UNCTAD dropped its demands for the adjustment of the international patent system to the developmental needs of the global South, and adopted a statement expressing the belief that the adoption of adequate and effective International Patent Protections and related efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would facilitate technological transfers to developing countries. Henceforth, UNCTAD had been sidelined by GATT, and its successor the WTO. The study finds that people have nothing to fear from a multi-polar world. And today it seems that the time is ripe for emerging economies to stand up and demand a greater role in the international arena related to the formulation of politics and economics, and in support of its historic promise to transform the world order. There has been a historically significant global shift in production and manufacturing from the advanced economies to the emerging economies, altering the economic geography of the world. The tendency over the past several decades to greatly intensify the globalisation of production, trade and financial flows was advocated primarily as a systemic solution to underlying structural problems in the international political economy, including growth, terms of trade, and productivity. But these same globalising tendencies have also enhanced the historical potential of economic growth and industrialisation in the emerging economies, although currently limited to only a few regions, but expected to spread in the coming decades.